Abstract. A financial market comprising of a certain number of distinct companies is considered, and the following statement is proved: either a specific agent will surely beat the whole market unconditionally in the long run, or (and this "or" is not exclusive) all the capital of the market will accumulate in one company. Thus, absence of any "free unbounded lunches relative to the total capital" opportunities lead to the most dramatic failure of diversity in the market: one company takes over all other until the end of time. In order to prove this, we introduce the notion of perfectly balanced markets, which is an equilibrium state in which the relative capitalization of each company is a martingale under the physical probability. Then, the weaker notion of balanced markets is discussed where the martingale property of the relative capitalizations holds only approximately, we show how these concepts relate to growth-optimality and efficiency of the market, as well as how we can infer a shadow interest rate that is implied in the economy in the absence of a bank.
0. Introduction 0.1. Discussion and results. We consider a model of a financial market that consists of d stocks of certain "distinct" companies. The distinction between companies clings on their having different risk and/or growth characteristics, and will find its mathematically precise definition later on in the text.
In absence of clairvoyance, the total capital of each company is modeled as a stochastic process S i , i = 1, . . . , d. Randomness comes through a set Ω of possible outcomes -for each ω ∈ Ω we have different realizations of S i (ω). Financial agents decide to invest certain amounts of their wealth to different stocks, and via their actions the value of S i t for each time t ∈ R + is determined.
Of major importance in our discussion will be the distribution of market capital, given by the relative capitalization κ i := S i /(S 1 + . . . + S d ) of each company (S 1 + . . . + S d is the total market capital). In particular, the limiting, i.e., long-run, capital distribution will be investigated. For addressing this question, a probability P is introduced that weights the different outcomes of Ω (for all events in some σ-algebra F); P reflects the average subjective feeling of the financial agents, but in this average sense it is not subjective anymore: each agent's investment decisions are fed back into the relative capitalization of the companies, and thus affects the random choice of the outcome. Via this mechanism, P becomes a real-world probability, and can also be regarded as the subjective view of a representative agent in the market, whose decisions alone reflect the cumulative decisions of all "small" agents.
The time-flow of information is modeled via a filtration F = (F t ) t∈R + . Each σ-algebra F t is supposed to include all (economical, political, etc.) information gathered up to time t and is increasing in time: F s ⊆ F t for 0 ≤ s < t < ∞. A "representative agent" information structure cannot be justified, since different agents might have very different ability or capability to access information. This difficulty can be circumvented by choosing F in a minimal way, i.e., by assuming that it is exactly the information contained in the company capitalizations -it is reasonable to assume that every agent has at least access to this information. This minimal information structure will turn out to be the most useful in our discussion (exactly because of its minimality property).
An important question from a modeling point of view is: how does one go about choosing P in a reasonable way in order to reflect the way financial agents act? From the economical side, the concept of efficiency has been quite extensively discussed in the literature. In his famous work [2] , Fama states that a market in which prices 'fully reflect' available information is called 'efficient'. Thus, efficiency is a property that the capitalization processes S must have under the pair (P, F), but it is questionable whether it opens the door to mathematically pin down what are the possible "reasonable" probabilities P.
In the field of Mathematical Finance it has been argued that a minimal condition for efficiency is absence of "free lunch" possibilities for agents; for if a free lunch existed, a sudden change in the capital distribution would occur to correct for it, which would contradict the requirement that prices fully reflect information. The notion of "no free lunch" found its mathematical incarnation in the existence of a probability Q that is equivalent to P (meaning that P and Q have the same impossibility events) under which capitalization processes suitably deflated have some kind of martingale property under (Q, F). However, as already mentioned this is only a minimal condition for efficiency. Indeed, consider a two-stock market in which deflated capitalization processes are modeled by S 1 t = exp(W 1 t ) and S 2 t = exp(100t + W 2 t ) where t ∈ [0, T ] for some finite T , and (W 1 , W 2 ) is a 2-dimensional standard Brownian motion. An equivalent martingale measure Q as described above exists for this model. Nevertheless, these being the only two investment opportunities in the market, reasonable agents would opt for the second choice over the first. Even if diversification was sought-after, significantly more capital would be held in the second rather than the first stock. This huge movement of capital would change the capitalization dynamics -this market does not appear to be in equilibrium, it is not balanced.
As mentioned previously, coupled with the choice of an equivalent martingale measure comes the choice of a deflator in the market. It is a usual practice to use the interest rate offered for risk-free investments for discounting. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the interestrate structure reflects the true market growth; a better index has to be perceived -and what would be more reasonable to use than the total market capital? Directly considering the percentage of the total capitalization that each individual company occupies, its performance in terms of the "competing" ones is assessed.
In the spirit of the above discussion, the idea of a perfectly balanced market is formulated by requiring that the relative capitalizations κ i are martingales under (P, F): E[κ i t | F s ] = κ i s , for all i = 1, . . . , d and 0 ≤ s < t. The last equality means that the best prediction about the future value of the relative capitalization of a company given today's information is exactly the present value of the relative capitalization. One might ask why is this martingale property plausible. Consider, for example, what would happen if E[κ i t | F s ] < κ i s for some company i. Since at all times the sum of all the relative capitalizations should be unit, we have E[κ j t | F s ] > κ j s for another company j. These inequalities suggest that the overall feeling of the market is that in the future (time t) the i th company will hold on average a smaller piece of the pie than it does today (time s), with the converse holding for company j -in other words, that company i is presently overrated, while company j underrated. The reasonable thing to happen is a movement of capital from company i to company j, which would move κ i s downwards and κ j s upwards, until finally E[κ i t | F s ] = κ i s holds for all i = 1, . . . , d. Perfect balance, as an equilibrium state, can undergo much criticism: there will certainly be times at which the market "slides away" from being perfectly balanced, but it would be reasonable to assume that the market is quickly trying to readjust itself to that state (as was explained in some sense in the previous paragraph). A mathematically rigorous description of this concept would require a formulation of an "approximate martingale" property for the relative capitalization vector κ. The widely-accepted idea of assuming the existence of another probability Q that is equivalent to P, and such that κ is a martingale under Q seems to be appropriate (actually, this exact idea has been utilized in Yan [11] , who has shown its equivalence to a "no-free-lunch" property relative to the total capitalization d i=1 S i ), as long as Q and P are "close" in some sense . This is not the road that will be taken here, and there are at least two good reasons: firstly, some (necessarily) ad-hoc, as well as difficult to justify in economic terms, definition of distance between P and Q would have to be given; secondly, existence of such a Q is not an ω-by-ω notion (as it looks at all possible outcomes instead), and after all what shall be ultimately revealed is only one outcome. However, an ω-by-ω definition of plainly balanced markets (based on a characterization of perfectly balanced markets given by observable quantities of the model) comes to the rescue -in some sense to be made precise later, the market is balanced if the process κ is close to being a martingale, but not quite there. The notion of balanced markets will turn out to be strictly weaker than the requirement of existence of such probability Q as described above in this paragraph.
Having decomposed the state space Ω as Ω b ∪ Ω u , where Ω b is the set of outcomes where the market is balanced and its complement Ω u is the set of outcomes that it is unbalanced, an analysis of the behavior of the market on each of the above two events is in order. It turns out that on Ω u a single agent can beat the whole market for arbitrary levels of wealth, an unacceptable situation since the total capital of the market should consist of the sum of the wealths of its respective agents; on the unbalanced set this breaks down, since one particular agent will eventually have more capital than the whole market. It then makes sense to focus on the balanced-market outcomes Ω b . There, it turns out that there always exists a limiting distribution of capital κ ∞ in the almost sure sense. If one further assumes that the market is segregated, in the sense that companies are distinct in a very weak sense, it turns out that all capital will concentrate in a single company. This is probably the most dramatic failure of market diversity pioneered by Fernholz [4] . In this last monograph, as well as in Fernholz, Karatzas and Kardaras [5] , it is shown that certain diverse markets offer opportunities for free lunches relative to the market. Taking up on this, the present work shows that failure of diversity inevitably leads to free lunches relative to the market -at the opposite direction, non-existence of free lunches (relative to the market) a-fortiori results in the accrual of capital to one company only. 0.2. Organization of the paper. We now give a brief overview of the material.
Section 1 introduces an Itô-process model for the capitalization of companies.
Perfectly balanced markets and their characterization in terms of the drifts and volatilities of the capitalization processes are discussed in section 2. To ensure a non-void discussion, abundance of perfectly balanced markets is proved.
In section 3 another economically interesting equivalent formulation of perfectly balanced markets is established: they achieve maximal growth. With this characterization, we introduce implied shadow interest rates in the market.
Next, the concept of balanced markets (a weakening of perfectly balanced markets) is formulated in exact mathematical terms in section 4. As previously noted, Ω is decomposed into Ω b and Ω u := Ω \ Ω b , and we characterize the balanced outcomes event Ω b as the maximal set on which an agent who decides to invest according to any chosen portfolio does not have a chance to beat the market for any unbounded level. In other words, on Ω b agents have a chance to beat the market by specific levels, but this chance is approaching zero uniformly over all portfolios that can be used when the level becomes arbitrarily large.
The limiting market capital distribution for balanced outcomes is taken on in Section 5. Existence of a limiting capital distribution κ ∞ in an almost sure sense is proved, and under a natural assumption of company segregation it is shown that all capital will concentrate in a single company and stay there forever.
Easy examples of a simple two-company market are presented in section 6 that clarify some of the points discussed previously in the paper.
Finally, in section 7 we discuss how all previous results are still valid in a more general quasileft-continuous semimartingale environment (as opposed to a plain Itô-process one). Note that, to the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first time that results on market diversity in such a general mathematical framework are discussed; in this sense, this last section is not present just for the sake of abstract generality, but to ensure that results obtained are not sensitive to the continuous-semimartingale modeling choice.
The Itô-Process Model
A continuous semimartingale market model consisting of d different companies will be consider up to and before section 7. Actually, attention will be restricted to continuous semimartingales whose drifts and covariations are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, Itô processes being a major example. It shall be come clear later that this is done only for presentation reasons.
The total capitalization of each company i = 1, . . . , d is denoted by S i . These capitalizations are modeled as strictly positive stochastic processes on an underlying probability space (Ω, F, P), adapted to a filtration F = (F t ) t∈R + , assumed right-continuous and augmented by P-null sets. The dynamics of each S i are: 
, for all i = 1, . . . , d and t ∈ R + . Remark 1.1. Let "Leb" denote Lebesgue measure on R + and "det" the square-matrix deter-
where σ is a square root of c: σσ ⊤ = c (check for example Karatzas and Shreve [8] ). Then, (1) is just an Itô process, and this model is classic -see Karatzas and Shreve [9] . If c is degenerate on a positive (P ⊗ Leb)-measure set, the above representation is still valid if one extends the probability space. Working directly with (1) helps to avoid such complications. Remark 1.2. The choice of "dt" above is merely for exposition purposes. At any rate, in section 7 the model is generalized to the broader class of quasi-left-continuous semimartingales. Remark 1.3. It will turn out that it is best to work under the (augmentation of the) natural filtration generated by S, which we denote by F S . Nevertheless, this restriction will not be imposed. Sometimes, we compare obtained results under two filtrations F and G, and it will be assumed that F is contained in G, in the sense that F ⊆ G, i.e., F t ⊆ G t for all t ∈ R + . If S is a semimartingale of the form (1) under G, and if F ⊇ F S , S is also an F-semimartingale and a representation of the form (1) is still valid, with the rates-of-return vector a possibly changed. (The local covariation matrix c will be the same.)
Perfectly Balanced Markets
The significance of perfectly balanced markets has already been discussed in the Introduction, so here we start directly with their definition. Definition 2.1. The relative capitalization κ i of company i is defined as
The market described by (1) will be called perfectly balanced with respect to the probability P and the information flow F if each κ i is a (P, F)-martingale.
The relative capitalizations process κ := (κ i ) 1≤i≤d lives in the open simplex
Remark 2.2. Keep the probability P fixed. If the model (1) is perfectly balanced with respect some filtration G that contains F, which in turn contains F S , then clearly it is also perfectly balanced with respect to the information flow F, since the martingale property remains. The converse does not necessarily hold: F-perfect balance of the market does not imply G-perfect balance: the martingale property might fail when enlarging filtrations. For agents with more information (political, insider, etc.), the market might fail to perfectly balance itself. The weakest form of a perfectly balanced market is obtained when the filtration is F Sthe one generated by S. In fact, an even smaller filtration can be used, namely, the one generated by κ (since the filtration generated by S has one extra ingredient, which is the total capitalization d j=1 S j that disappears when we only consider κ). It is true that one can do all subsequent work under this even smaller filtration -after all, all that we shall care about is incorporated in κ and if one starts by assuming κ is the actual capital process, everything follows.
2.1.
Characterizing perfectly balanced markets. Using Itô's formula and (1), it is easily computed that for all i = 1, . . . , d we have
where e i the unit vector with all zero entries but the i th , which is unit. The above equation (4) for κ i , i = 1, . . . , d gives us a way to judge whether the market is perfectly balanced just by looking at drifts and local covariations. 
Proof. Each of the processes κ i is bounded; therefore it is a martingale if and only if it is a local martingale, which by view of (4) will hold if and only if e i − κ, a − cκ = 0. The vector processes (e i − κ) 1≤i≤d span the linear subspace that is orthogonal to 1. Thus, in order for κ to be a martingale there should exist a one-dimensional process r such that a − cκ = r1. The fact that r can be chosen predictable and locally integrable follows from the fact that both cκ and a have the corresponding properties.
Remark 2.4. It should be noted here that the process r plays the rôle of a shadow interest rate in the market, in the absence of a banking device that will produce one. To support this claim, suppose for a minute that one of the companies, say the first, behaves like a savings account, so that (if only approximately) S 1 has only a "dt" component, i.e., c 1i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , d.
Multiplying from the left both sides of the relationship (5) with the unit vector e 1 we get a 1 = r, i.e., that r is the interest rate. In the absence of a risk-free company one cannot carry the previous analysis, but an equilibrium-type argument gives the same conclusion; we come back to this point in subsection 3.3 with a more thorough discussion.
Remark 2.4 makes it plausible to define an interest rate process as being a predictable, one-dimensional process r with
The result of Proposition 2.3 should be interpreted as a linear relationship between the local covariation and the drifts of the company capitalization processes, modulo an interest rate process. It is obvious that this is a very restrictive condition; we shall see in Section 4 how to weaken it, and we shall discuss how this softer notion of (not necessarily perfectly) balanced markets ties with efficiency.
2.2. Construction of perfectly balanced markets. Equations (4) and (5) combined imply that in a perfectly balanced market the process κ must satisfy the following system of stochastic differential equations:
The natural question to ask at this point is: do mathematical models of perfectly balanced markets exist? If they do exist, (5) as well as the stochastic differential equations (6) must hold. The following proposition shows that a plethora of perfectly balanced models exist.
Further, for any interest rate process r and Proof. The second paragraph of the Proposition's statement is obvious from our previous discussion; we only need prove that the system of stochastic differential equations (6) has a unique strong solution for t ∈ R + that lives on ∆ d−1 .
To begin, consider the unit
The volatility coëfficients appearing in (6) are quadratic in κ, thus are obviously Lipschitz as a functions of κ on [0, 1] d ; then, the standard theorem on strong solutions of stochastic differential equations gives that (6) has a unique strong solution for t in a stochastic interval [[0, τ ] ], where τ is a stopping time such that for all t < τ we have κ t ∈ (0, 1) d , while on {τ < +∞} we have
, and then that P[τ = +∞] = 1.
Using (6) 
Both the finite-variation part and the quadratic variation of the local martingale part of the semimartingale log κ i are finite on any bounded interval as long as κ ∈ ∆ d−1 ; it follows that on the event {τ < +∞} we have lim t↑τ log κ i t ∈ R, which implies that lim
, it also follows that lim t↑τ κ i t < 1 for all i = 1, . . . , d. This contradicts the fact that we are assumed to work on the event {τ < +∞}, therefore P[τ = +∞] = 1. Remark 2.6. One of the reasons not to require F to be the one generated by S is the constructive Theorem 2.5, where we start a-priori with some filtration F that makes M a P-martingale and r adapted. If wanted, after the construction of κ has been carried out we can pass from F to the generally smaller F S .
Remark 2.7. Apart from its mathematical significance, Theorem 2.5 also has interesting economic implications. When writing the dynamics (1) of a model we assume that both the drift vector a and the local covariation matrix c are observable. Nevertheless, both in a statistical and in a philosophical sense, covariances are easier to assess than drifts. From a statistical point of view, high-frequency data can lead to reasonably good estimation of c -and the ideal case of continuously-collected data leads to perfect estimation. Nevertheless, there is no easy way to estimate a, even if we assume it is a constant: one has to wait for too long a time to get any sensible estimate. In a more philosophical sense, economic agents might not have a complete sense of how the prices will move, but they might very well have an idea of how risky the companies are, and how a change in the capitalization of one company would affect another one, i.e., exactly the local covariation matrix c. To this effect, Theorem 2.5 implies that simple knowledge of the local covariations c, the interest rate r (see Remark 2.4 and subsection 3.3 in this respect) and the relative capitalizations at time t = 0 is enough to provide the whole process of relative capitalizations; and by this, we also get the drifts a. Thus, in perfectly balanced markets, a good estimate of c is enough to provide good estimates for the drift a as well.
Growth-Optimality of Perfectly Balanced Markets
We discuss here an "economically optimal" property of perfectly balanced markets that actually turns out to be an equivalent formulation in a sense. We also elaborate on how the process r of Proposition 2.3 should be thought as a shadow interest rate prevailing in the market.
3.1. Agents and investment. In a market with d companies whose capitalizations are described by the dynamics (1), we also consider a savings account offered by a bank, described by some interest rate process r. One unit of currency invested in (i.e., loaned to) the bank at time s will grow to t s r u du by time t > s. We remark that existence of a bank does not add wealth to the market directly, although can do so indirectly by adding more flexibility to the financial agents -in other words, the net amount invested in the bank must be zero: some lend and some borrow, but the total position should be neutral.
We now discuss the behavior of an individual agent in the market; this agent decides to invest a portion of the total capital-in-hand in each of the d companies, and the remaining wealth in the savings account. We shall be denoting by π i t the proportion of the capital invested in the i th company; then, 1 − π, 1 proportion of the capital-in-hand is put into savings. To ensure than no clairvoyance into the future is allowed, the vector process π := (π i ) 1≤i≤d should be predictable with respect to the filtration of the individual agent, which is at least as large as F S .
We model portfolio constraints that an agent might be faced with via a set-valued process C; henceforth we shall be assuming that for each (ω, t) ∈ Ω × R + :
is the closure of the open simplex of (3);
(2) the set C(ω, t) is closed and convex; and (3) C is predictable, in the sense that
Then, a C-constrained portfolio is a predictable, d-dimensional process π that satisfies π(ω, t) ∈ C(ω, t) for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω × R + , and
The class of all C-constrained portfolios is denoted by Π C .
The most important case in the discussion to follow is the most restrictive case of constraints C = ∆ d−1 : the agent has only access to invest in the "actual" companies of the market -in this case, the bank is not even needed. The portfolio integrability requirement (7) is a technical one, but it is the weakest assumption in order for the stochastic integrals appearing below in (8) to make sense. The requirement is certainly satisfied if π is P-a.s. bounded on every interval [0, t] for t ∈ R + -for example if
The initial investment of an agent at time zero is always normalized to be a unit of currency. Assuming this and investing according to π ∈ Π C , the corresponding wealth process V π of the particular agent is described by V π 0 = 1 and
The collective investment of all agents is captured by the percentage of the total market capitalization invested in each company, i.e., the relative capitalizations κ = (κ i ) 1≤i≤d , which is an F-predictable vector process (as it is F S -adapted and continuous) and satisfies κ ∈ ∆ d−1 ; thus κ can be viewed as a portfolio, and as such it is called the market portfolio. Here is the reason for such a name: using (8) 
is the total capital of the market: investing according to κ is tantamount to owning the whole market, relative to the initial investment, which is normalized to unit.
3.2.
Growth and growth-optimality. The process a π := π, a appearing in (8) is known as the rate of return of V π ; it is the instantaneous return that the strategy gives on the invested capital. Nevertheless, for long-time-horizon investments, rates of return fail to give a good idea of the behavior of the wealth process. A more appropriate tool for analyzing asymptotic behavior is the growth rate (see for example Fernholz [4] ), which we now define.
For a portfolio π ∈ Π C , its log-wealth process is the semimartingale log V π . Itô's formula gives d log V π t = g π t dt + π t , dM t , where
is the growth rate of the portfolio π. The portfolio ρ ∈ Π C will be called growth-optimal in the C-constrained class if
The whole market is called a growth market if the market portfolio κ is growth optimal over all possible portfolios. Proof. In order to have a growth market, κ must solve the quadratic problem
over all p ∈ R d where we have hidden the dependence on (ω, t). The growth rate function of (9) is concave, and first-order conditions imply that in order for κ to be a solution to the optimization problem we must have a − cκ = r1.
Remark 3.2. Generalizing a bit the method-of-proof of Proposition 3.1, we can give the following characterization: ρ is C-constrained growth optimal portfolio if and only if V π /V ρ is a supermartingale for all π ∈ Π C . Indeed, for any two portfolios π and ρ, one can use (8) and Itô's formula to get that V π /V ρ is a supermartingale is and only if π − ρ, a − r1 − cρ ≤ 0; this is exactly the first-order condition for maximization of (11) over C.
Remark 3.3. Statistical tests of the "perfectly balanced market" hypothesis have appeared in the literature in the seventies, where it was actually tested whether the market portfolio is equal to the growth-optimal one (the connection is obvious in view of Proposition 3.1 -see also the discussion in the next subsection 3.3). We mention in particular the works of Roll [10] , as well as Fama and MacBeth [3] that treat the New York Stock Exchange as the "market". In both papers, there does not seem to be conclusive evidence on whether the perfect-balance hypothesis holds or not; although it cannot be rejected at any reasonably high statistical significance level, there are noteworthy deviations mentioned therein.
3.3. Interest rate. Proposition 3.1 clearly shows the connection between growth and perfectly balanced markets. The difference between Propositions 2.3 and 3.1 is that in the former we infer the existence of an interest rate r that satisfies cκ = a − r1, while in the latter the interest rate process is given as a market parameter. In fact, if existence of an interest rate process is not assumed, and a growth market is defined as one where κ maximizes the growth rate over all portfolios in the constrained set C = {x ∈ R d | x, 1 = 1}, then going through the proof of Proposition 3.1 using Lagrangemultiplier theory for constrained optimization, the relationship cκ = a − r1 for some interest rate process r will be inferred again, exactly as in the case of perfectly balanced markets. Thus, the two concepts of growth and perfectly balanced markets are identical in this sense. Now, an equilibrium argument will be used to show that even in the absence of a bank, the arbitrary process r obtained in the case where the market is perfectly balanced really plays a rôle of an interest rate. Suppose that all of a sudden, the market decides to build a bank and has to decide on what interest rater to offer. In the next paragraph we answer the following question: What should this processr be in order for the market to stay in perfectly balanced state? Then,r is an an equilibrium interest rate.
Before the introduction of a bank the market was perfectly balanced, i.e., cκ = a − r1 was true for some one-dimensional process r. The introduction of a savings account gives more freedom to individual agents: now they can borrow or lend at the risk-free interest rater. The "representative agent" in the augmented (with the bank) market will still try to maximize growth, as before, and for this representative agent the wealth proportion held in the bank should be zero. Indeed, if in trying to maximize the growth rate the representative agent found that the optimal holdings in the risk-free security is positive, the overall feeling of the agents is that the interest rate levelr is attractive for saving, and more agents would be inclined to save money that to borrow for investment in the riskier company of the market; this would create instability because supply for funds to be invested in riskier companies would exceed demand. The exact opposite of what was just described would happen if the representative agent's optimal holdings in the risk-free security were negative. Proposition 3.1 implies that after the introduction of a bank we should have cκ = a −r1; nevertheless, just before the bank appeared we had cκ = a − r1. The only way that both can hold is r =r, which shows that r really plays the rôle of an equilibrium interest rate process, even in the absence of a bank.
Balanced Markets
The definition of a perfectly balanced market is restrictive, since the martingale property for the relative capitalizations is not expected to exactly hold. Sometimes it might fail and it also might take some time to return to equilibrium, as explained in the Introduction. We therefore want to say that the market will be balanced (though not necessarily perfectly) if the martingale property holds only "approximately". No such reasonable notion exists, and one needs to work around it. In this section we elaborate on balanced markets and their close relation to a concept of "efficiency".
4.1. Formal definitions. According to Proposition 3.1 and the content of subsection 3.3, a market equipped with a bank is perfectly balanced if and only if g κ = g * , where g * ≡ g * (F,C) is the maximal growth that can be obtained by using F-predictable and C-constrained portfolios. In general, we have g κ ≤ g * , and the market will be balanced if this difference is not very large. b ] = 1, the market described by (1) will be called balanced with respect to the probability P, the information flow F and the constraints C.
Remark 4.2. If a predictable process ρ that solves the maximization problem (10) exists for all (P ⊗ Leb)-almost every (ω, t) ∈ Ω × R + and ρ satisfies the integrability conditions (7) we then have g * = g ρ . This always happens if C is contained in a fixed compact subset K of R d for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω × R + .
In general, a predictable process ρ solving (10) might not exist; even if it does exist, the integrability conditions (7) might not be fulfilled. It can be shown that ρ exists and satisfies (7) if and only if L t < ∞ for all t ∈ R + , P-a.s. A thorough discussion of these points is made in Karatzas and Kardaras [7] .
Consider two filtrations F and G such that F S ⊆ F ⊆ G; G-perfect balance implies Fperfect balance. The same holds for simply balanced markets.
Proposition 4.3. Consider two pairs of filtrations and constraints (F, C) and (G, K) with
We then have that lim n→∞ ↑ g * (F,Cn) = g * (F,C) and lim n→∞ ↑ g * (G,Kn) = g * (G,K) and thus it suffices to prove g * (F,C) ≤ g * (G,K) under the assumption C ⊆ K ⊆ K for some compact set K. According to Remark 4.2, under this assumption the growth-optimal portfolios ρ(F, C) and ρ(G, K) exist and g * (F,C) = g ρ(F,C) as well as g * (G,K) = g ρ(G,K) . From Remark 3.2 we know that V ρ(F,C) /V ρ(G,K) is a positive supermartingale, which gives that log(V ρ(F,C) /V ρ(G,K) ) is a local supermartingale; the drift of the last local supermartingale -which should be decreasingis
)dt, which gives us g * (F,C) ≤ g * (G,K) and completes the proof. 4.2. Some discussion. We contemplate slightly on balanced markets.
Trivial example.
Perfectly balanced markets satisfy L ≡ 0, and are therefore balanced.
No bank.
Let us assume now that C = {x ∈ R d | x, 1 = 1} -we are allowed to invest in the risky companies, but there is no bank (for us, at least).
We assume that c is non-degenerate for (P ⊗ Leb)-almost every (ω, t) ∈ Ω × R + ; then, the maximization problem (10) has a solution ρ that satisfies cρ = a − r1 for some unique onedimensional process r. On the (P ⊗ Leb)-full measure subset of Ω × R + where c is non-singular it is clear that ρ = c −1 (a − r1); using ρ, 1 = 1 it is easy to see that
Now, straightforward computations give
(One can also show the last relationship observing that V κ /V ρ is a local martingale and taking the logarithm.) Perfectly balanced markets satisfy cκ − a + r1 = 0 identically with r given by (12); simply balanced markets do not satisfy the last equation identically, but approximately:
We remark that on Ω b , r earns the name of an interest rate process, i.e., it is locally integrable. More specifically, it will be shown below that for any random time τ we have τ 0 |r u |du < ∞ on {τ < ∞, L τ < ∞}. Define F t := t 0 κ u , c u κ u du; on {τ < ∞} we have F τ < ∞. The Cauchy-Schwartz inequality gives
Interest rate revisited.
Continuing the above discussion, where no bank is present, suppose that we wish to introduce an interest rate processr in such a way as to keep the market balanced -at least on the event that it was balanced before. In the case of perfectly balanced market,r ≡ r must hold -here, we shall see that we have this last equality holding approximately.
We still assume that c is non-singular on a set of full (P ⊗ Leb)-measure (which is very reasonable to justify the introduction of a bank). A solutionρ of the optimization problem (10) in the market augmented with the bank exists, and cρ = a −r1. Straightforward, but somewhat lengthy, computations show that
where ρ := c −1 (a − r1) and r is given by (12). Introducing a bank that offers interest rater keeps the market balanced if and only if
t 1 |r t − r t | 2 dt < ∞, which can be seen as an approximate equality between r andr.
Equivalent Martingale Measures.
We now delve into the relationship between balanced markets and the existence of a probability Q ∼ P that makes the relative capitalizations κ i Qmartingales. We call such a probability Q an equivalent martingale measure (EMM), although it does not apply directly to the actual, rather to the relative capitalizations. The concept of a balanced market is closely related, but weaker than the existence of an EMM. It is not hard to see why it is weaker: assume the existence of an EMM Q and denote by Z the density process, i.e., Z t := (dQ/dP)| Ft . Since Q ∼ P, we have P[Z ∞ ] > 0. The Kunita-Watanabe decomposition implies
where h is an d-dimensional predictable process and the strictly positive local martingale N is strongly orthogonal to M . The integrand h need not be unique, but the local martingale
Since κ has to be a Q-martingale, one can show that we can choose h = ρ − κ, where ρ is the growth-optimal portfolio, that must exist. Since Z ∞ > 0 and N ∞ < +∞, P-a.s. we also have that E ∞ > 0, P-a.s.; in view of Lemma A.2 this is equivalent to saying that the quadratic variation of the local martingale · 0 h u , dM u is finite at infinity -but this is exactly L ∞ ; thus the existence of an EMM implies that the market is balanced.
In section 6 we shall see by example that the notion of a balanced market is actually strictly weaker than existence of an EMM Q.
4.3.
Balanced markets and efficiency. The chances for an agent to do well relatively to the overall wealth are very different depending on which of the events Ω b and Ω u is being considered. The next result gives a characterization of Ω u in terms of beating the whole market. • On Ω b , and for any portfolio π ∈ Π C the limit of the relative wealth process lim t→∞ (V π t /V κ t ) exists and is R + -valued. The probability of beating the whole market for ever-increasing levels converges to zero uniformly among all portfolios:
• Further, Ω b is the maximal set that (13) holds: there exists ρ ∈ Π C such that
Proof. Consider the growth optimal portfolio ρ in the class Π C -since C is a constant compact subset of R d this certainly exists. Take now any portfolio π ∈ Π C ; Remark 3.2 gives that the relative wealth process V π /V ρ is a positive supermartingale. Then, for any l > 0 we have
e., the collection {sup t∈R (V π t /V ρ t )} π∈Π C is bounded in probability. Further, Itô's formula for the semimartingale log(V κ /V ρ ) reads (14) log
Observe then that on Ω b both the finite-variation part and the quadratic variation of the local martingale part of the semimartingale log(V κ /V ρ ) are finite all the way to infinity, thus
for all π ∈ Π C , we see that the collection {sup t∈R + (V π t /V κ t )} π∈Π C is bounded in probability on Ω b , which is exactly the first claim (13).
The fact that L dominates twice the quadratic variation process of the local martingale · 0 κ u − ρ u , dM u enables one to use the strong law of large numbers (Lemma A.1 of the Appendix) in (14) and show that we have
on Ω u = {L ∞ = ∞}, which proves the second claim.
Remark 4.5. The assumption C = ∆ d−1 in Theorem 4.4 is being made to ease the proof, and also because it will be the only case we need in the sequel. This assumption can be dropped; Theorem 4.4 still holds, with some possible slight changes which we now describe. The essence of the assumption C = ∆ d−1 was to make sure that the growth-optimal portfolio ρ exists in the class Π C ; thus, the proof remains valid whenever C is contained in a compact subset of R d . In the general case, one might not be able to use ρ directly (since it might not even exist), but rather a subsequence of (ρ n ) n∈N where ρ n defined to be the C n -constrained growth-optimal portfolio where C n := C ∩ [−n, n] d and replace the second bullet in 
Segregation and Limiting Capital Distribution of Balanced Markets
Here, we describe the limiting behavior of the market on the set of balanced outcomes Ω b . We take the latter event to be as large as possible, which by Proposition 4.3 means that for this section we consider the case where the filtration is F S and C = ∆ d−1 . By Theorem 4.4, on the event Ω u an investor with minimal information can construct an all-long portfolio that can beat the market unconditionally; to keep our sanity, it is best to assume that the market is balanced.
Limiting capital distribution.
The following result is a simple corollary of Theorem 4.4. (All set-inclusions appearing from now on are valid modulo P.)
Proof. Write κ i = κ i 0 (V e i /V κ ) and use the first claim of Theorem 4.4 with π = e i . Thus, we know that on Ω b there exists a limiting capital distribution in a very strong sense: there is almost sure convergence of the relative capitalizations vector. The next task is to identify this distribution.
Sector equivalence and segregation.
We give below a definition of some sort of distance between two companies. To introduce the definition and get an idea of what it means, remember that if π 1 and π 2 are two portfolios, the drift of the log-wealth process log(
dt, where g π 1 |π 2 := g π 1 − g π 2 , and that its quadratic variation is 
The segregation event is Σ := {i ≁ j, for all pairs of companies (i, j)}; if P[Σ] = 1, the market will be called segregated.
Market segregation is conceptually very natural. Indeed, if two companies satisfy i ∼ ω j for some outcome ω ∈ Ω, then the total quadratic variation of the difference of their returns all the way to infinity is finite; in this sense, the total cumulative uncertainty (up to infinity) that they bear is very comparable. The same happens for their growth rates, as (15) implies. In this case they should really be viewed and modeled as the same entity of the market. To really speak of "different" companies, they must have some different uncertainty or growth characteristics; this makes Definition 5.2 perfectly reasonable. 
|dt is a local martingale. We have {i ∼ j} ∩ {j ∼ k} ⊆ {lim t→∞ log(κ i t /κ k t ) exists} from (16), hence e i − e k , M has a finite limit at infinity on {i ∼ j} ∩ {j ∼ k}, which means that its quadratic variation up to infinity has to be finite on the latter event, i.e., ∞ 0 |c i|k t |dt < ∞ on {i ∼ j} ∩ {j ∼ k}, and the claim is proved. The same holds for the relationship ∼ described in Remark 5.3 above for portfolios.
On the event {κ ∞ := lim t→∞ κ t exists} ∩ {i ∼ j} we have κ i ∞ = 0 ⇔ κ j ∞ = 0, and thus also κ i ∞ > 0 ⇔ κ j ∞ > 0; this is trivial in view of (16). A somewhat surprising partial converse to this last observation is given now.
Lemma 5.5. For any pair
Proof. Since V κ /V ρ has a strictly positive limit at infinity on Ω b , we get that the local martingale V e i /V ρ has a strictly positive limit at infinity on Ω b ∩{κ i ∞ > 0}. According to Lemma A.2, this means that 
5.3.
One company takes all. Now comes the main result of this section.
In particular, in a balanced and segregated market, κ ∞ exists P-a.s. and is equal to a unit vector.
Proof. This is a simple corollary of Lemma 5.5: On Ω b , if we had κ i ∞ > 0 and κ j ∞ > 0 for any two companies i and j, we should have i ∼ j; but the segregation event Σ is exactly the one where i ≁ j for all pairs of companies (i, j).
Remark 5.7. This is a follow-up to the discussion in paragraph 4.2.4 on Equivalent Martingale Measures. Existence of an EMM Q, coupled with Theorem 5.6, imply that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , d} we have
> 0 as well. This ceases to be true anymore if we consider balanced markets. Indeed, in the next section one finds an example of a balanced and segregated market, such that a specific company takes over the whole market with probability one.
Examples
We consider here a parametric "toy" market model in order to illustrate the results of the previous subsections and to clarify some points discussed. The market will consist of two companies, and their capitalizations are S 0 and S 1 . Under P, S 0 ≡ 1, while S 1 0 = 1 and dS 1 t = S 1 t (a t dt + σ t dW t ), where a and σ are predictable processes, σ is strictly positive, and W is a one-dimensional Brownian motion. In the three cases we consider below we always have 0 ≤ a/σ 2 ≤ 1/2; it then turns out that ρ = (1 − a/σ 2 , a/σ 2 ) and easy computations show that
Observe that the random quantity ∞ 0 |σ t S 1 t | 2 dt is the quadratic variation of the local martingale S 1 up to infinity, which should be finite, since S 1 has a limit at infinity. Therefore, the market is balanced:
Observe also that {0 ≁ 1} = {lim t→∞ S 1 t = 0} = {κ ∞ = e 0 }. Here, the limit in the event Ω b ∩ {0 ≁ 1} = {0 ≁ 1} is identified as being e 0 , and one sees that on {0 ∼ 1} we have 0 < κ 0 ∞ < 1 as well as 0 < κ 1 ∞ < 1. In a balanced market with equivalent companies the limiting capital distribution might not be trivial.
Assume now that P[
; easy examples of this is when σ is a positive constant, or when S 1 is the inverse of a three-dimensional Bessel process. From the discussion above, the market is balanced and segregated. We note that there cannot exist any probability measure Q ∼ P such that κ is a Q-martingale; for if there existed one, the bounded martingale κ 1 would be uniformly integrable, so that 0 = E Q [κ 1 ∞ ] = κ 1 0 = 1/2 should hold, which is impossible.
This example clearly shows that balanced markets form a strictly larger class than the ones satisfying the EMM hypothesis discussed in 4.2.4. 6.2. Case ǫ ≤ a/σ 2 ≤ 1/2 − ǫ. Here we assume the previous inequality holds for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω × R + for some 0 < ǫ < 1/4; for example, one can just pick some predictable, strictly positive process σ and then set a = σ 2 /4.
As in the previous case a = 0, we have {0 ≁ 1} = {lim t→∞ S 1 t = 0} = {κ 1 ∞ = 0} -this follows from (17); just divide the equality
and then use a − σ 2 /2 ≤ −ǫσ 2 as t tends to infinity. Because of this last fact, using ǫ ≤ a/σ 2 and (17) again, we easily get {0 ≁ 1} ⊆ {L ∞ = ∞} = Ω u = Ω \ Ω b . This example shows that the limiting capital distribution can be concentrated in one company even in the set where then market is not balanced.
6.3. Case a = σ 2 /2. In this case, log S 1 is a local martingale with quadratic variation which shows that the result of Proposition 5.1 cannot be strengthened. It also shows that it is exactly the unbalanced markets that bring diversity into the picture and the hope that not all capital will concentrate in one company only.
The Quasi-Left-Continuous Case
We now discuss all the previous results in a more general setting, where we allow for the processes of company capitalizations to have jumps. For notions regarding semimartingale theory used in the sequel, one can consult Jacod and Shiryaev [6] . Numbered subsections correspond to previous numbered sections, i.e., subsection 7.1 to section 1, subsection 7.2 to section 2, and so on.
7.1. The set-up. We denote by S i the capitalization of company i. Each S i , i = 1, . . . , d is modeled as a semimartingale living on an underlying probability space (Ω, F, P), adapted to the filtration F = (F t ) t∈R + that satisfies the usual conditions. One extra ingredient that has to be added (in view of Example 7.2 later) is to allow for the capitalizations to become zero, which can be considered as death, or annihilation of the company. We define the lifetime of company i as ζ i := inf{t ∈ R + | S i t− = 0 or S i t = 0}; each ζ i is an F-stopping time. After dying, companies cannot revive; thus we insist that S i t ≡ 0, for all t ≥ ζ i . Note thateven though individual companies might die -we suppose the whole market lives forever; max 1≤i≤d ζ i = +∞, P-a.s.
We want to write an expression like:
where dX i t plays the equivalent rôle of a i t dt + dM i t of (1). Let us assume for the moment that ζ i = ∞ for all i = 1, . . . , d, so that X i can be defined as the stochastic logarithm of S i :
. Then, we know that if we fix the canonical truncation function x → xI {|x|≤1} (I A will denote the indicator of a set A), the canonical decomposition of the semimartingale X = (X 1 , . . . , X d ) is
In the decomposition (19), B is predictable and of finite variation; M is a continuous local martingale; µ is the jump measure of X, i.e., the random measure on R + × R d defined by µ([0, t] × A) := 0≤s≤t I A\{0} (∆X s ), for t ∈ R + and A ⊆ R d ; the asterisk " * " denotes integration with respect to random measures; η is the predictable compensator of µ -it satisfies [|x| 2 ∧ 1] * η t < ∞ for all t ∈ R + , and η[R + × (−∞, −1) d ] = 0, since each S i (i = 1, . . . , d) is constrained to be positive.
Since we do not know a-priori that ζ i = ∞ for all i = 1, . . . , d, we take the opposite direction of assuming the representation (19), and pick as inputs a continuous local martingale M , a quasi-left-continuous semimartingale jump measure µ, and a continuous process B that is locally of finite variation before a possible explosion to −∞. The continuous local martingale M being obvious, we remark on the last two objects.
A semimartingale jump measure µ is a random counting measure on R + × R d with µ(R + × {0}) = 0 and µ({t} × R d ) being {0, 1}-valued for all t ∈ R + , such that its predictable compensator η exists and satisfies [|x| 2 ∧1] * η t < ∞ for all t ∈ R + . µ being quasi-left-continuous means µ({τ } × R d ) = 0 for all predictable stopping times τ ; this is equivalent to η({t} × R d ) = 0 for all t ∈ R + . In other words, jumps are permitted as long as they only come in a totally unpredictable (inaccessible) way. It will also be assumed that µ[R + × (−∞ The twist comes for the predictable finite-variation process B, for which we shall assume that its coefficient-processes can explode to −∞ in finite time. In other words, for each i = 1, . . . , d there exists a strictly increasing sequence of stopping times (ζ i n ) n∈N such that the stopped process B i ζ i n ∧t t∈R + is continuous (thus predictable) and of finite variation, and that
It is clear that we can choose ζ i n := inf{t ∈ R + | B i t = −n}. We further define (20) Setting C := [M, M ] to be the quadratic covariation process of M , the triple (B, C, η) is called the triplet of predictable characteristics of X. One can find a continuous, onedimensional, strictly increasing process G such that the processes C and η are absolutely continuous with respect to it, in the sense of the equations (21) below -for instance, one can
We shall also assume that each B i , i = 1, . . . , d is absolutely continuous with respect to G on the stochastic interval [[0, ζ i [[ -otherwise it can be shown that there are trivial opportunities for free lunches of the most egregious kindone can check [7] , Section 5, for more information. It then follows that we can write
Here, all b, c and ν are predictable, b is a vector process, c is a positive-definite matrix-valued process and ν is a process with values in the space of measures on R d that satisfy ν({0}) = 0 and integrate x → 1 ∧ |x| 2 (so-called Lévy measures). Each process
The differential "dG t " will be playing the rôle that "dt" was playing before -for example, an interest rate process now is a one-dimensional predictable process r such that t 0 |r u |dG u < ∞ for all t ∈ R + . 7.2. Perfectly balanced markets. The notion of a perfectly balanced market is exactly the same as before: we ask that κ is a vector (P, F)-martingale.
The first order of business is to find necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the triplet (b, c, ν) for the market to be perfectly balanced. Itô's formula gives that the drift part of the stochastic logarithm process
In a perfectly balanced market, this last quantity has to to vanish -using same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2.3 we get the following result. 
Using (22) above one computes that in a perfectly balanced market the relative company capitalization κ i for each i = 1, . . . , d satisfies
where E is the stochastic exponential operator. In order to get a result about existence of perfectly balanced markets similar to Theorem 2.5 one has to start with the continuous local martingale M and a quasi-left-continuous semimartingale jump measure µ and show that equations (23) have a strong solution. Below, we show by example that even if we start with an initial distribution of capital κ 0 in the open simplex ∆ d−1 (so that κ i 0 > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , d) and jumps of size −1 are not allowed by the jump measure, annihilation of a company might come at finite time -stock-killing times were not included just for the sake of generality, but they come up naturally if possibly unbounded jumps above are allowed for the company-capitalization processes.
Example 7.2. Consider a simple market with two companies (we call them 0 and 1) for which κ 0 0 = κ 1 0 = 1/2, M ≡ 0, and µ is a jump measure with at most one jump at time τ that is an exponential random variable, and size l(τ ) for a deterministic function l given by l(t) = 1 − e t/2 /2 −1 I [0,2 log 2) (t). Observe that there is no jump on {τ > 2 log 2}, an event of positive probability, and that ν t (dx) = I (0,τ ] δ (0,lt) (dx), where δ is the Dirac measure. Now, according to (23) the process κ 1 should satisfy
, for all t < τ.
It can be readily checked that the solution of the previous (ordinary) differential equation for t < min{τ, 2 log 2} is κ 1 = 1/l. Thus, on {τ ≥ 2 log 2} (which has positive probability), we have κ 1 t = 0 for all t ≥ 2 log 2, i.e., P[ζ 1 < ∞] > 0. Proof. More or less, one follows the steps of the proof of Theorem 2.5, with some twists. We assume that the initial condition κ 0 lives on ∆ d−1 -any company i = 1, . . . , d for which κ i 0 = 0 can be safely disregarded, since then κ i ≡ 0. Set K n := [n −1 , 1 − n −1 ] d for all n ∈ N; the coëfficients of (23) are Lipschitz on K n . A theorem on strong solutions of stochastic differential equations involving random measures has to be invoked -one can check for example Bichteler [1] (Proposition 5.2.25, page 297) for existence of solutions of equations of the form (23) in the case of Lipschitz coëfficients. We infer the existence of an increasing sequence of stopping times (τ n ) n∈N such that κ t ∈ K n for all t < τ n and κ τn ∈ R d \ K n . Using (23) On the event {τ < ∞} we continue the construction of the solution to (23) inductively, removing all companies that have died. In at most d − 1 steps we either have constructed the solution for all t ∈ R d , or only one company (say, i) has remained in which case we shall have κ = e i from then onwards.
7.3. Perfect balance and growth. Growth-optimality of a portfolio and the market are now defined, and their relation to perfect balance is established.
A portfolio is a d-dimensional predictable and X-integrable processes, and from now onwards we restrict attention to the C-constrained class Π C where C ≡ ∆ d−1 . If V π denotes the wealth process generated by π we have
where r is some interest rate process coming from a bank in the market. The market portfolio is not κ now, but rather its left-continuous version κ − (the vector process κ as appears in (2) is not in general predictable, but only adapted and right-continuous). It is trivial to check that V κ − = S, 1 / S 0 , 1 .
The concept of growth of a portfolio is sometimes not well-defined, as the log-wealth process log V π might not be a special semimartingale, which means that its finite-variation part fails to exist. In order to define a growth optimal portfolio ρ, we use the idea contained in Remark 3.2: we ask that V π /V ρ is a supermartingale for all π ∈ Π C . It turns out (one can check [7] , for example) that this requirement is equivalent to rel(π|ρ) ≤ 0 for all π ∈ Π C , where the relative rate of return process is (24) rel(π|ρ) := π − ρ, b − r1 − π − ρ, cρ + π − ρ, x 1 + ρ, x − π − ρ, x I {|x|≤1} ν(dx).
The market will be called a growth market if κ − is growth-optimal according to this last definition. It is easily shown that in order to have a growth market we must have (22) holding, where r is now the banking interest rate. Exactly the same remarks on interest rates hold as the ones in subsection 3.3 -the concepts of perfect balance and growth in markets are thus equivalent. We can extend the discussion further when A or B might explode to ∞ in finite time, i.e., if the lifetimes ζ X := inf{t ∈ R + |X t = −∞} and ζ Y := inf{t ∈ R + |Y t = −∞} are finite, exactly as described in subsection 7.1 of the main text.
